As a fundamental cryptographic tool, (t,n)-threshold secret sharing ((t,n)-SS) divides a secret among n shareholders and requires at least t, (t<=n), of them to reconstruct the secret. Ideal (t,n)-SSs are most desirable in security and efficiency among basic (t,n)-SSs. However, an adversary, even without any valid share, may mount Illegal Participant (IP) attack or t/2-Private Channel Cracking (t/2-PCC) attack to obtain the secret in most (t,n)-SSs.To secure ideal (t,n)-SSs against the 2 attacks, 1) the paper introduces the notion of Ideal Tightly cOupled (t,m,n) Secret Sharing (or (t,m,n)-ITOSS ) to thwart IP attack without Verifiable SS; (t,m,n)-ITOSS binds all m, (m>=t), participants into a tightly coupled group and requires all participants to be legal shareholders before recovering the secret. 2) As an example, the paper presents a polynomial-based (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme, in which the proposed k-round Random Number Selection (RNS) guarantees that adversaries have to crack at least é ù 2 / m symmetrical private channels among participants before obtaining the secret. Therefore, k-round RNS enhances the robustness of (t,m,n)-ITOSS against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost. 3) The paper finally presents a generalized method of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS into a (t,m,n)-ITOSS, which helps an ideal (t,n)-SS substantially improve the robustness against the above 2 attacks. Keywords：Ideal Secret Sharing; Robustness; Illegal Participant Attack; t/2-Private Channel Cracking Attack
INTRODUCTION 1.1 Ideal (t,n)-Threshold Secret Sharing
As a cryptographic building block, the first (t,n) threshold secret sharing (or (t,n)-SS) scheme was introduced independently by Shamir [23] and Blakley [2] in 1979. A ) , ( n t -SS scheme divides a secret into n shares and allocates each share to one shareholder such that 1) t or more than t shareholders are able to reconstruct the secret but 2) fewer than t shareholders can't. Besides the above 2 schemes, there are other ones such as Massey's linear code based scheme [20] , Mignotte's [22] and Asmuth-Bloom's [1] Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) based schemes. (t,n)-SS is widely used in many applications such as group signature [2, 10] , group authentication [12, 16] , threshold encryption [7] , secure multi-party computation [6] etc. Today, SS is still studied in many aspects [24, 9, 4] .
As the most popular SS scheme, Shamir's (t,n)-SS scheme [23] is based on a polynomial of degree 1 -t over a finite field, in which the dealer computes n values of the polynomial and sends each value to a shareholder privately as the share. According to Lagrange interpolation, t or more than t shareholders can reconstruct the polynomial and thus obtain the secret, which is also a value of the polynomial. However, less than t shareholders can't recover the secret.
In 1989, Brickell [8] defined that a SS is ideal if 1) an unqualified group of shareholders gets no information about the secret and 2) the share space has the same size as the secret space. An ideal SS has the perfect probability distribution of the secret and the highest efficiency of secret sharing in term of share size. Therefore, ideal (t,n)-SSs are most desirable among (t,n)-SSs in both security and efficiency. Both Shamir's [23] and Massey's [20] schemes are ideal; moreover, Blakley's scheme can also be modified into an ideal scheme [8] . However, Mignotte's [22] and Asmuth-Bloom's [1] schemes are not ideal because both share spaces are always larger than their respective secret spaces in size.
Two Attacks against (t,n)-SSs
In (t,n)-SSs, shareholders are often called participants when they participate in secret reconstruction and there usually exists a symmetric private channel (or SPC) between any 2 shareholders (e.g., a pair of shareholders set up a SPC by some key agreement protocol). Usually assumed to be absolutely secure in most (t,n)-SSs, a SPC enables a pair of shareholders to exchange shares privately. During secret reconstruction, each participant delivers its share privately to the others through corresponding SPCs, and can recover the secret when at least t shares are available.
However, an adversary without any valid share (or Outsider), could compromise (t,n)-SSs in the following 2 cases. 1) If the Outsider manages to join the secret reconstruction as one of m (m>t) participants, it can obtain the secret by collecting up to t shares from the others. We name it Illegal Participant (or IP) attack.
2) In extreme cases, the Outsider may crack a SPC. That is, the Outsider may figure out the SPC key or intercept the shares through the SPC in some way. If the Outsider could crack é ù 2 / t SPCs, no matter how many participants exist in the secret reconstruction, it may obtain up to t shares by intercepting these cracked SPCs and thus recover the secret. We simply call it t/2-Private Channel Cracking (or t/2-PCC) attack.
The paper focuses on how to simultaneously address the 2 attacks in an ideal (t,n)-SS to prevent an Outsider from obtaining the secret.
Related Work
In order to prevent an Outsider from participating in the secret reconstruction (IP attack), Chor et al. [5] proposed the notion of verifiable secret sharing (VSS) in 1985. VSS enables a shareholder to prove that its share is valid without revealing it. There are many papers on VSS [11, 15, 26, 27] in the literature. Although VSS can be used to check the validity of each share; but it is very complicated and requires additional information to enable verification, it means a VSS scheme may not be ideal. Moreover, an Outsider may obtain the secret if it could directly cracks é ù 2 / t SPCs among participants. To prevent an Outsider from obtaining the secret without VSS, Harn [13] proposed a secure secret reconstruction scheme based on Shamir's (t,n)-SS in 2013. In the scheme, the dealer chooses k (k>=2) polynomials over a finite field and generates k shares for each shareholder. Each polynomial includes a sub-secret, and the secret is a linear combination of the k sub-secrets. Before m (m>=t) shareholders recover the secret, each participant constructs a Lagrange component, which is also the linear combination of its k shares. The secret is recovered by summing up all m Lagrange components. The scheme is simpler than VSSs in preventing IP attack. However, it requires each participant to hold k shares and the parameter k is restricted by the threshold t and the total number of shareholders n, thus it is not flexible enough. Miao et al. [21] improved Harn's scheme by using randomized components instead of multiple polynomials, which allows each shareholder to have only one share and is more flexible than Harn's scheme. Both schemes guarantee that an Outsider has to break at least é ù 2 / m SPCs to recover the secret, where m, the number of participants, could be much larger than the threshold t and é ù 2 / m is apparently the maximum lower bound. Nevertheless, both schemes are not ideal because the share(s) each shareholder has is several times larger than the secret in size.
Currently, the following 2 methods, complete shuffling and partial shuffling, can be used to improve the robustness of an ideal (t,n)-SS against t/2-PCC attack and defeat IP attack.
In order to provide authentication service in ad hoc networks, Kong, Luo and Lu et al. [18, 19] presented a secret sharing based certificate service. Substantially, it utilizes the complete shuffling algorithm to protect initial shares during new share generation. In the complete shuffling algorithm, each pair of participants exchanges a shuffling factor, and each participant finally gets m-1 shuffling factors in total if there are m participants. A participant protects its share by constructing a shuffled partial share with the m-1shuffling factors. All m shuffled partial shares are required during the generation of a new share; they also protect m participants' shares during the new share generation. As proved in [17] , a share is actually equivalent to a secret, thus new share generation in a (t, n)-SS can be viewed as the procedure of secret reconstruction. If we apply the complete shuffling algorithm to an ideal (t,n)-SS with SPCs, an Outsider has to crack at least é ù
/ m
SPCs to obtain all m shuffled partial shares before figuring out the secret.
There are totally
shuffling factors exchanged in the algorithm, which works well if m is a small number. However, it is not efficient in communication for most (t, n)-SSs in which m may be a large number. Thus Zhang et al. [28] proposed a partial shuffling algorithm, m participants in the algorithm form a loop according to the order of subscripts, each participants just picks one random number as its shuffling factor, sends it to the following participant and constructs its shuffled partial share with the share, the shuffling factor and the preceding participant's shuffling factor. All m shuffled partial shares are also required to reconstruct the secret.
Although only m shuffling factors need to be exchanged in the partial shuffling algorithm [28] , Nevertheless, if we apply the partial shuffling algorithm to an ideal (t,n)-SS with SPCs among participants, it is possible for an Outsider to obtain the secret merely by cracking min{ é ù
That is because the Outsider can recover the secret in either of the 2 cases, 1) intercepting all m shuffled partial shares after cracking at least é ù 2 / m SPCs, 2) obtaining t shares after cracking continuous t+1 SPCs. That is, the partial shuffling algorithm improves the robustness of an ideal (t,n)-SS against t/2-PCC attack at most 2 times no matter how large m is.
Therefore, it is necessary to shuffle shares at a low communication cost such that an Outsider has to crack at least é ù 2 / m SPCs before obtaining the secret.
Contributions
In order to prevent an adversary without any valid share from obtaining the secret, the paper focuses on how to thwart IP attack and improve the robustness against t/2-PCC attack simultaneously in an ideal (t,n)-SS.
To attain this goal, we will first present the notion of ideal tightly coupled (t,m,n) secret sharing ( or (t,m,n)-ITOSS) to thwart IP attack, (t,m,n)-ITOSS requires all m (m>=t) participants, instead of only part of them, to have valid shares before recovering the secret. Then, we will present the k-round Random Number Selection algorithm to associate secret reconstruction with enough SPCs to enhance the robustness of (t,m,n)-ITOSS against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost.
The main contributions of the paper include 1) the formal definition of (t,m,n)-ITOSS, 2) an polynomial-based (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme with k-round Random Number Selection (RNS) algorithm and 3) a generalized method of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS into a (t,m,n)-ITOSS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, section 2 gives some preliminaries and section 3 formally defines the ideal tightly coupled (t,m,n) secret sharing scheme; as an example, a polynomial based (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme is proposed in section 4, security analyses and properties are presented respectively in section 5 and section 6. Section 7 generalized the method of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS into a (t,m,n)-ITOSS and section 8 concludes the paper.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Notations
The notations in table 1 will be used throughout the paper. 
and the mean mutual information of X with respect to Y is denoted by 
U is the public information (or identity) of the th j shareholder. The algorithm generates a set of n shares
is the share generation function. U are called participants when they participate in secret reconstruction. 
Secret Reconstruction algorithm--
3) The share space and the secret space are of the same size, i.e.
Remark: A (t,n)-secret sharing scheme satisfying 1) and 2) is perfect with respect to the set of probability distributions in the secret space S . That is, the secret s can be viewed as a random variable uniformly distributed over S .
DEFINITION OF IDEAL TIGHTLY COUPLED (T,M,N)-SECRET SHARING
Informally, a (t,n)-SS is tightly coupled if it further meets the following requirements, for a group of
participants, 1) the secret can be recovered only if all m participants necessarily possess a valid share each and actually participate in the secret reconstruction; 2) any adversary, not belonging to the group, cannot figure out the secret within the group even if it is a legal shareholder. 
and generates as output a set of n shares
, where
is the share generation function. 
Randomized Component Construction algorithm--
as output, where
, a random number, is uniformly selected by j U in F and ) (U sub denotes the space of subsets of U .
Here we name C is the RC set actually used in recovering the secret s with
2) Equal Size
The share space and the secret space have the same size, i.e. 
PROPOSED (T,M,N)-ITOSS SCHEME
Actually, Definition 3 has described the framework of (t,m,n)-ITOSS. As an instance, we will put forward a concrete (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme based on Shamir's (t,n)-SS to prevent IP attack in a simple way. In the scheme, we will also propose a Random Number Selection algorithm based on Euler's totient function, and then use the algorithm to improve the robustness against t/2-PCC attack. In fact, (t,m,n)-ITOSS schemes can also be constructed based on other ideal (t,n)-SSs, e.g. linear code or hyperplane based ideal (t,n)-SSs.
System Model

Entities and Communication Model
Similar to most (t,n)-SSs, there are 2 types of entities, 1 dealer and n shareholders, in the proposed scheme.
Dealer:
The dealer is the coordinator trusted by all shareholders, and is responsible for the initialization of the scheme such as deciding system parameters, choosing the secret, generating and distributing shares and so on. The dealer is supposed to be honest, which means that it selects parameters to make the scheme secure enough, keeps critical parameters private, generates valid shares and distributes them securely.
Shareholders:
In (t,m,n)-ITOSS, there are totally n shareholders. Shareholders are called participants when they are participating in secret reconstruction.
We assume that each shareholder receives the valid share from the dealer securely, since share distribution can be completed offline in advance. Besides, each pair of shareholders is supposed to have a symmetrical private channel (or SPC) between them, and thus both shareholders can exchange information over the SPC privately. However, a SPC is not absolutely secure in some extreme cases.
Each shareholder receives a share from the dealer via the secure channel. To recover the secret, at least t shareholders need to form a tightly coupled group; each of them generates a RC for the secret, releases it to the others privately through SPCs, and finally reconstructs the secret.
A tightly coupled group of E is the set of unordered pairs, i.e., Figure 1) 
Adversary Model
Aiming to prevent adversaries without valid shares from obtaining the secret in an ideal (t,n)-SS, the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS mainly consider the adversary Outsider, which has no valid share.
For a group of m shareholders (i.e., participants) in a certain secret reconstruction, Outsiders have the following capability: 1) All Outsiders probably crack some, but not all, SPCs among m (m>=t) participants and eavesdrop all plaintexts of messages through these cracked SPCs. (see Figure 1) 2) An Outsider may disguise itself as a participant (but without a valid share) in some way, set up SPCs with m-1 shareholders to form a group of m participants and receive messages from the others.
3) An Outsider cannot obtain the share directly from inside a shareholder. Otherwise, it can impersonate the compromised shareholder. 4) In order to obtain the authentic secret, Outsiders don't send messages containing a fake share to participants in secret reconstruction.
Remark:
The (t,m,n)-ITOSS aims to prevent an Outsider from obtaining the secret rather than to ensure recovering the correct secret. Therefore, we assume that all shareholders would rather give up secret reconstruction than leak the secret to Outsiders, because safeguarding the secret is of the first importance in secret sharing schemes. That is why we assume 4) is true, because releasing a fake share does not help an Outsider obtain the secret. 
The 2nd round
Random Number Selection (RNS) Algorithm
In a (t,m,n)-ITOSS, all participants form a tightly coupled group by constructing a Randomized Component each to thwart IP and t/2-PCC attacks. Before generating RCs, all m participants need to run the following k-round RNS algorithm collectively to choose a private random number each. To enhance the robustness against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost, RNS employs Euler's totient function to associate a proper number of SPCs with the selection of each private random number. A k-round RNS algorithm comes as follows. 
Note that each round can proceed in parallel.
In this way, Generally speaking, in order to improve the robustness of (t,m,n)-ITOSS against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost but at a relatively low communication cost, the number of rounds , k should be the least such that an adversary has to crack é ù
SPCs before obtaining the secret. The reason will be explained in theorem 5. Proof. Let us prove the theorem from the following 2 aspects, 1) the number of SPCs involved and 2) the privacy of each private random number.
1）Number of involved SPCs
In the first round, 
containing m SPCs, to obtain the first number each, e.g., j U gets
Generally, in the th
round, they follow the path, ,...,
, also including m private channels, to choose the th h number each. e.g., j U picks 
2) Privacy of each random number
In the first round, a participant, e.g. 
, to cover 12 
= m
SPCs and obtain a private random number each. However, if = m 2, 3 and 4, one cannot find 2 paths which share no SPCs. 
(t,m,n)-ITOSS Scheme based on Shamir's (t,n)-SS
The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS aims to secure an ideal (t,n)-SS against t/2-PCC and IP attacks so that it can efficiently prevent an Outsider from obtaining the secret.
Assume that there are n shareholders,
in private, where
is the secret to be shared and p is a large prime. According to Definition 3, (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme consists of the following 3 algorithms. 
1) Share Generation algorithm-
. } ), ( | { Ω p j j j j F U U f s s Í Î = = U
2) Randomized Component Construction algorithm--
= , the secret can be recovered by (2).
SECURITY ANALYSES
In this section, we first prove the function of RC in protecting the share by Theorem 2, and then prove that the proposed scheme is tightly coupled and ideal in Theorem 3 and 4 respectively, which means (t,m,n)-ITOSS is secure against IP attack. Next, the robustness against t/2-PCC attack is demonstrated in Theorem 5. Finally, the security against (t-1) conspiring shareholders is given by Theorem 6. 
Theorem 2. Given a RC in the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS, an Outsider obtains no information about the contained share. Formally, given
Theorem 2 implies that the RC j c is capable of protecting the share j s from exposure; besides, the proposed scheme suggests that RCs also serve the function of recovering the secret.
In the following, we use Theorem 3 to prove the security of the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS against IP attack. 
Theorem 3. The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme is tightly coupled. Formally, if
Proof. Provide that
is the tightly coupled group of m participants, with the RC set
Note that the secret s is uniformly selected from p F in private by the dealer, and thus, for the Outsider, is virtually a random variable uniformly distributed over . Recall that C , unknown to the Outsider. It follows that the probability of (4) 
is the probability density function of with the knowledge of .
C' As a result, an Outsider has C , is used to recover the secret, no information about the secret can be obtained. In other words, recovering the secret requires each participant to have a valid share and actually release a valid RC. Theorem 3 apparently conforms to the tightly coupled perfectness of (t,m,n)-ITOSS defined by (1) , it also demonstrates the security of (t,m,n)-ITOSS against IP attack.
Theorem 4. The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS is ideal.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, RCs, instead of shares, are used to recover the secret. Thus it is natural for us to examine the property of being ideal in terms of RCs rather than shares.
It is obvious that 1) The secret has the same range p F with RCs, i.e. the secret space and the RC space are of the same size; 2) Theorem 3 indicates that no additional information about the secret can be obtained from an unqualified RC set, .
C' Therefore, the proposed scheme is ideal. o Proof. Outsiders are adversaries without any valid share in (t,m,n)-ITOSS. In order to recover the secret, they have to acquire either all m RCs or at least t shares. Otherwise, no extra information can be obtained.
1) To acquire at least
is the increasing sequence of integers relatively prime to m and less than 
-ITOSS scheme employs RCs, instead of shares, to recover the secret. However, each RC,
s , once Outsiders get j c and the private random number j r by cracking SPCs, they can easily acquire the share j s .
In the k-round RNS, each participant ,
has the private random number (ii) m t < In this case, to obtain t shares of t neighbor participants, Outsiders need to first crack continuous 1
+ t
SPCs, jointed by the t participants, in the first round of RNS. And then, they also need to break extra SPCs, connecting the same t participants, in each of the other 1 -k rounds. Note that there are always 2 SPCs to and from a participant in each round.
Thus, in the th
where u is the number of i d in the k-round RNS with
Obviously, Outsiders have to crack at least m SPCs before obtaining the secret in (i) and (ii-a). Therefore, the least SPCs to crack in case 1) is at least é ù 
2) To acquire all m RCs
As theorem 3 implies, recovering the secret requires all m RCs. Again, we view the tightly coupled group of E is the set of unordered pairs, i.e.,
is actually the SPC between participants j U and 
, which is obviously the greatest lower bound of SPCs to break in t/2-PCC attack.
As a result, we know from 1）and 2) that, Outsiders have to crack at least é ù Actually, it hardly happens in practical applications that 4 10 participants simultaneously take part in a secret reconstruction merely with the threshold 3. Moreover, , which is the maximum among all (t,n)-SSs with SPCs among participants. In other words, we associate the least number of SPCs to crack with the number of participants instead of the threshold, which implies that the more participants are involved, the more robust a (t,m,n)-ITOSS is.
However, as in most (t,n)-SSs, less than t shareholders may conspire and try to reconstruct the secret with their shares, Theorem 6 shows the security of the scheme against t-1 shareholders conspiring.
Theorem 6. In the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS,
shareholders have no information about the secret.
Proof. The secret reconstruction in (t,m,n)-ITOSS eventually depends on the Lagrange interpolation polynomial of degree t-1, which is the same in nature as Shamir's (t,n)-SS. If the dealer chooses the polynomial 
PROPERTIES AND COMPARISONS 6.1 Properties
The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme based on polynomial has the following properties.
1) Tightly coupled
The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme requires that all m participants form a tightly coupled group by each constructing a RC with the share, and the secret is recovered by RCs instead of shares. Moreover, recovering the secret requires all m participants to necessarily hold a valid share each and actually take part in secret reconstruction. Otherwise, the secret cannot be recovered. The property of being tightly coupled guarantees that an Outsider, without any valid share, is unable to obtain the secret within the tightly coupled group. However, the above Outsider may obtain the secret in basic (t,n)-SSs [1, 2, 20, 22, 23] by mounting an IP attack. This property thwarts IP attack without verifiable secret sharing.
2) Unconditionally secure
Unconditional security [6, 13] means the security of a scheme holds even if adversaries have infinite computing power and storage capacity. Apparently, the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme is unconditionally secure because it doesn't depend on any assumption of hard problem or one-way function. It is better than most verifiable secret sharing schemes [5, 11, 26, 15, 27] , which also aim to prevent Outsiders from obtaining the secret but are built on some hard problem such as discrete logarithm problem.
3) Ideal
Our scheme obviously conforms to the definition of ideal (t,n)-SS. However, Harn's scheme [13] and Miao's scheme [21] are not ideal because their shares of each shareholder are all larger than their respective secrets in size.
4) Highly robust
In basic (t,n)-SSs [1, 2, 20, 22, 23] and most Verifiable SSs, it is possible for Outsiders to collect t shares and thus recover the secret as long as they crack é ù . Therefore, our scheme can substantially improve the robustness against t/2-PCC attack when m is much larger than t.
Comparisons
The k-round RNS algorithm improves the robustness of our scheme against t/2-PCC attack. Compared with the complete shuffling [18, 19] , it enables (t,m,n)-ITOSS to have the same greatest lower bound of é ù For different thresholds, Figure 3 shows the relationship between the numbers of participants and messages exchanged among them in the 3 algorithms. In the cases of 75 , 20 , 2 = t with m participants, the complete shuffling needs to exchange Figure 3 also implies that the larger thresholds are, the fewer messages k-round RNS exchanges for given m . That is because fewer rounds are required in the group of m participants for the larger threshold.
For fixed numbers of participants, Figure 4 indicates that the k-round RNS exchanges much less messages than the complete shuffling; with the increase of , t the number of messages in the k-round RNS converges to m, which is equal to that of the partial shuffling. Moreover, the larger m is, the slower it converges. That is because, to make
for a given threshold t, the k-round RNS requires more rounds (i.e. a larger k) for more participants (i.e., larger m), and thus more messages (i.e., km messages) need to be exchanged.
For different thresholds, Figure 5 shows that the partial shuffling has the least SPCs to crack before obtaining the secret, which is min{ é ù ,
That is, a scheme with the partial shuffling is the weakest against t/2-PCC attack. For , substantially higher than that of the partial shuffling when m is much larger than t. It means that the k-round RNS algorithm is capable of enhancing the robustness of an ideal (t,n)-SS against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost. The only exception is case of t=2, in which lower bounds of SPCs to crack are less than but pretty close to é ù Therefore, k-round RNS raises the robustness of an ideal (t,n)-SS against t/2-PCC attack to the maximum in almost all cases. Moreover, it enables the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS to get a good balance between the communication cost and the robustness against t/2-PCC attack.
GENERALIZED WAY FROM IDEAL (T,N)-SS TO (T,M,N)-ITOSS
From Definition 2 to 3, we actually get the method of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS scheme into a (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme.
According to the definition of an ideal SS [8] , the share space and the secret space should be of the same size, and they are the same in practice. Therefore, we uniformly use a finite field F , with operators (*, +), to denote the share space i S , secret space S and other related domains in ideal (t,n)-SSs, and thus all operations are conducted over F . is an ideal (t,n)-SS scheme defined in Definition 2, to convert it into , the RC based secret reconstruction algorithm of (t,m,n)-ITOSS, can be expressed by the secret reconstruction function Obviously, the generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS is ideal because it shares with the ideal (t,n)-SS the same secret and shares over the same finite field F , uses the same the secret reconstruction function 
Theorem 7. The generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS is tightly coupled.
Proof. We actually need to prove that the generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS conforms to (1) . To do this, we first demonstrate that 
